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STATE V. PAYNE: POLICE OFFICER NEEDED TO BE 
QUALIFIED AS AN EXPERT WITNESS TO TESTIFY AS TO 
THE FUNCTION OF CELL PHONE TOWERS; CO-
DEFENDANTS ARE NOT A PARTY OPPONENTS FOR 
HEARSAY PURPOSES. 
 
By: Allison Terry 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a police officer testifying as to 
the methods used to place a defendant near a crime scene through the use of 
cell phone towers and call logs must be qualified as an expert witness.  State 
v. Payne, 440 Md. 680, 718, 104 A.3d 142, 164 (2014).  The court further held 
that statements made by a criminal co-defendant will not be admissible under 
a hearsay exception as a statement of a party opponent under Maryland Rule 
5-803(a)(1).  Id.  Finally, the court held that the trial court erred in admitting 
the statement of a co-defendant as that of a co-conspirator. Id.  
     Officers discovered a body on fire in the woods.  Early investigation led 
detectives to the cell phone records of Desmond Jones (“Jones”), who later 
testified about the decision to burn the victim’s body.  Using these records, 
investigators identified numbers associated with Joseph William Payne 
(“Payne”) and Jason Bond (“Bond”) as pertinent to their investigation.  
Detective Brian Edwards (“Edwards”) obtained subpoenas for Payne and 
Bond’s cell phone records.  During trial, Edwards testified, without being 
qualified as an expert witness, as to his use of the defendants’ cell phone 
records to determine their location on the night of the crime. 
     The prosecution offered into evidence six telephone calls between Bond 
and various individuals regarding an alibi for the night of the murder against 
both Payne and Bond.  In these conversations, Bond discussed the use of a 
fabricated alibi placing himself and Payne with Brittany Keller (“Keller”) and 
others the night of the murder.  Payne was not on the phone for any of these 
calls.  At trial, Keller testified about her face-to-face meeting with Payne.  
     The trial court convicted Payne and Bond in a joint trial for first degree 
felony murder and other related crimes.  The trial court found that Edwards’s 
testimony did not require him to be qualified as an expert.  Further, the trial 
court found the six phone conversations were admissible against Payne under 
the co-conspirator hearsay exception provided by Maryland Rule 5-803(a)(5). 
     The defendants appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 
which reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial.  The intermediate 
appellate court held that the trial court erred in admitting Edwards’s testimony 
because he should have been qualified as an expert witness.  The intermediate 
appellate court also found the wiretapped phone calls admissible against 
Payne; however, the phone calls were held admissible under Maryland Rule 
5-803(a)(1) as admissions of a party opponent rather than under Maryland 
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Rule 5-803(a)(5) as statements of a co-conspirator.  The State then filed a 
petition for writ of certiorari, which the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted. 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by addressing 
whether Edwards needed to be qualified as an expert witness.  Payne, 440 Md. 
at 685, 104 A.3d at 144.  The court discussed Maryland Rules 5-701 and 5-
702, which govern the admission of opinion testimony and expert testimony, 
respectively.  Id. at 698-700, 104 A.3d at 153.  Maryland Rule 5-702 provides 
that expert testimony “may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, 
if the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”  Id. at 698, 104 A.3d 
at 153 (citing Maryland Rule 5-701).  Further, expert testimony will be 
admitted when a juror would have to rely on speculation and conjecture rather 
than actual understanding of the subject matter.  Id. at 699, 104 A.3d at 153.   
     The court analyzed Edwards’s testimony using precedent requiring police 
officers to be qualified as experts where they characterized interactions as drug 
transactions.  Payne, 440 Md. at 699, 104 A.3d at 153-54 (citing Ragland v. 
State, 385 Md. 706, 725-26, 870 A.2d 609, 620 (2005)).  In Ragland, the court 
found that the officers’ opinions were based on their time spent studying the 
drug trade, therefore requiring knowledge superior to that of a lay person.  Id.  
In the case sub judice, the court similarly found that Edwards’s methods used 
to reach his conclusion were beyond the knowledge of a lay person and 
required additional training and experience.  Id. at 701, 104 A.3d at 154.  
Specifically, the court determined that Edwards could not reach his 
conclusions by simply reading the records and following directions provided 
by the cell phone carrier.  Id.  Therefore, the court held that the prosecution 
needed to qualify Edwards as an expert due to the complicated nature of cell 
phone towers and the manner in which Edwards used the cell phone records.  
Id. at 702, 104 A.3d at 155.  
     The court next analyzed the admissibility of the wiretapped statements 
between Bond and other individuals as evidence against Payne under the party 
opponent hearsay exception.  Payne, 440 Md. at 703, 104 A.3d at 155.  The 
party opponent hearsay exception allows for the admission of a person’s own 
statement “in either an individual or representative capacity,” which mirrors 
the corresponding Federal Rule of Evidence.  Id. at 709, 104 A.3d at 159 
(quoting Md. Rule 5-803(a)(1))(citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 801(d)(2)(A)).  While 
there is a lack of judicial interpretation regarding the Maryland Rule, federal 
courts have held that a criminal co-defendant does not qualify as a party 
opponent; only the government is a party opponent in criminal cases.  Id. 
(citing United States v. Hardwood, 998 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Gossett, 877 F.2d 901, 906 (11th Cir. 1989)(per curiam)).  Using this, 
the court found that in the instant case the State was Payne’s only opponent; 
thus, the wiretaps were improperly admitted against Bond as statements of a 
party opponent.  Id. at 710, 140 A.3d at 159.    
     The court then addressed whether the wiretapped statements could be 
admitted as statements of a co-conspirator.  Payne, 440 Md. at 710, 104 A.3d 
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at 159-60.  The co-conspirator exception allows admittance of a statement 
made by a co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.  Id. at 
724 n.3, 140 A.3d at 169 n.3 (quoting Md. Rule 5-803(a)).  To be admissible, 
the proponent must make a prima facie showing of conspiracy and prove the 
opposing party’s assent to the conspiracy.  Id. at 712-13, 140 A.3d at 161 
(citing State v. Johnson, 367 Md. 418, 424, 788 A.2d 628, 632 (2002)).  In 
determining assent to the conspiracy, the commission of one crime does not 
automatically establish consent to a second conspiracy to then cover up the 
first crime.  Id. at 712, 104 A.3d at 161 (citing State v. Rivenbark, 311 Md. 
147, 158, 533 A.2d 271, 276 (1987)).  However, if the parties agree at the 
outset to engage in a second conspiracy to conceal the crime, statements made 
in the context of this conspiracy are admissible.  Id. (citing Rivenbark, 311 
Md. at 158, 533 A.2d at 276).  The court determined the evidence was 
sufficient to establish the requisite prima facie showing of a conspiracy.  Id. at 
718, 533 A.3d at 165.  Despite this, the court concluded that neither Jones nor 
Keller’s testimony was sufficient to establish Payne’s assent.  Id. at 713-14, 
104 A.3d at 161-62.  Although both Keller and Jones’s testimony reflected 
Payne’s involvement of the crime, neither demonstrated any assent to enter 
into the conspiracy.  Id.    
     Finally, the court considered whether the State could play the recordings at 
the joint trial as evidence against Bond without violating Payne’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.  Payne, 440 Md. at 714, 104 A.3d at 714.  The court found 
that the statements made in the wiretapped conversations were non-
testimonial. Therefore, the court held that the wiretapped conversations did 
not implicate the Confrontation Clause.  Id. at 717-18, 104 A.3d at 164.  
Nevertheless, the trial court must consider on remand the adequacy of a 
cautionary instruction or joinder to protect Payne’s rights.  Id. 
     In Payne, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that statements of a co-
defendant cannot be admitted under the party opponent or co-conspirator 
hearsay exceptions.  The court also held that a police officer testifying 
regarding the interpretation of cell phone records should be qualified as an 
expert.  Practitioners will have to keep in mind the possibility of qualifying 
officers as expert witnesses, or providing a second expert witness to explain 
the technology, when cell phone towers are used during investigations.  This 
requirement is likely to prove troublesome for lower income or indigent clients 
who may not be able to shoulder the added expense of acquiring an expert 
witness to combat the expert testimony of a police officer.  
